Abstract
The article analyzes the implications of economic incentives for reporting acts of corruption in the public sector. It begins with a review of the state of the art on the subject, to demonstrate the limited interest this subject has elicited both in Mexico and the rest of Latin America. It then explores the advantages and disadvantages of economic incentives, as well as their interaction with others such as protection, obligations, and fines. It highlights the effect of motivational displacement as the most important consideration for designing regulations in this regard. The article contributes to the debate on strategies to combat corruption through public policies.
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